MARKET DISCIPLINE AS A MECHANISM FOR INSTITUTIONALISING TRUST IN THE FINANCIAL AND BANKING SYSTEM OF UKRAINE

Keywords: market discipline, institutionalization of trust, trust rationalizers, information disclosure, deposit insurance, state-owned banks, corporate governance

Abstract

The article examines market discipline as a mechanism for institutionalizing trust in the financial and banking system. It proposes a five-component model comprising information transparency, monitoring agents, channels of influence, responsibility for risk, and the response of the financial institution. The Ukrainian case is analyzed using a qualitative institutional approach based on regulatory changes, the structure of the banking market, and the available channels through which market signals may affect bank behavior. The study develops the principle of the constraining link, according to which the effectiveness of market discipline is limited by the component that is least capable of transmitting a risk signal to the next stage of the mechanism. This approach extends the traditional division of market discipline into monitoring and influence by showing that the transmission of a signal may be interrupted at several intermediate stages. In Ukraine, the main constraint is responsibility for risk, which is weakened by full deposit guarantees during martial law and by the substantial role of state-owned banks. At the same time, information transparency is gradually improving as prudential disclosure requirements based on Pillar 3 are introduced. The findings show that greater transparency alone is insufficient when market participants have weak incentives to bear the consequences of risk or when the market lacks effective pricing channels. The practical implication is that the weakest elements of market discipline should be strengthened before the return to limited deposit insurance. This primarily concerns the quality of market signals, the role of professional monitoring agents, the development of pricing channels for bank risk, and corporate governance, especially in state-owned banks. The scientific novelty lies in presenting market discipline as a sequential institutional mechanism in which the overall result depends on the effective operation of every link rather than on the formal presence of its individual elements. The model can therefore be used not only to describe market discipline, but also to diagnose the point at which the transmission of market signals becomes ineffective. The study is limited by the qualitative nature of the assessment and by the exceptional incentive structure created during martial law. Further research should develop quantitative indicators for each component and test the model on bank-level data after the normalization of the deposit guarantee regime.

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Bliss, R. R., & Flannery, M. J. (2002). Market discipline in the governance of U.S. bank holding companies: Monitoring vs. influencing. European Finance Review, 6(3), 361–395.

Calomiris, C. W., & Kahn, C. M. (1991). The role of demandable debt in structuring optimal banking arrangements. American Economic Review, 81(3), 497–513.

Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Huizinga, H. (2004). Market discipline and deposit insurance. Journal of Monetary Economics, 51(2), 375–399.

Flannery, M. J. (1998). Using market information in prudential bank supervision: A review of the U.S. empirical evidence. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 30(3), 273–305.

Gropp, R., Gruendl, C., & Guettler, A. (2014). The impact of public guarantees on bank risk-taking: Evidence from a natural experiment. Review of Finance, 18(2), 457–488.

Martinez Peria, M. S., & Schmukler, S. L. (2001). Do depositors punish banks for bad behavior? Market discipline, deposit insurance, and banking crises. Journal of Finance, 56(3), 1029–1051.

Nier, E., & Baumann, U. (2006). Market discipline, disclosure and moral hazard in banking. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 15(3), 332–361.

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Published
2026-11-18
How to Cite
Grytsenko, R. (2026). MARKET DISCIPLINE AS A MECHANISM FOR INSTITUTIONALISING TRUST IN THE FINANCIAL AND BANKING SYSTEM OF UKRAINE. Kyiv Economic Scientific Journal, (15), 60-66. https://doi.org/10.32782/2786-765X/2026-15-7
Section
SCIENTIFIC ARTICLES