DETECTING POTENTIAL SANCTIONS BUSTING AND EVASION USING INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS DATA

Keywords: international trade, trade flows, trade partners, sanctions, sanctions busting, sanctions evasion

Abstract

The article is devoted to identifying patterns in changes in trade values between various countries and russia that could indicate sanctions busting or evasion. We start by examining the dynamics of russia’s trade indices and comparing them with global average values, finding that the impact of sanctions potentially contributed to a decrease in the physical volume of exports from russia, while the volume of imports increased nonetheless. We then study how russia adapted to sanctions by comparing the average values of exports and imports between the 2015-2021 and 2022-2025 periods. Specifically, we find a major decrease in trade with Europe, but an increase in both exports to and imports from russia for China and other mainland Asian countries, as well as an increase in imports from russia for some African and South American countries, although large part of the latter consists of fuel imports. We also note the product specialization of some countries that significantly increased their exports to russia, including for some products classified as medium- and high- technology manufactures. The results show an increased role of China, Belarus, India, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Armenia, Iran, Uzbekistan, the United Arab Emirates, and Azerbaijan as all-purpose supplier to sanctioned russia; Kyrgyzstan, Ireland, Indonesia, Slovenia, Turkmenistan, Egypt, the Faroe Islands, Georgia, Ghana, Tajikistan, Guinea, and Croatia as product-specialized suppliers; and China, Iran, and Kazakhstan as technology-specialized suppliers. We hypothesize that a substantial increase in trade with russia from 2022 onward might be indicative of sanctions busting, when a third country offsets the impact of sanctions by providing a substitute for restricted goods, while a simultaneous increase in imports of a product from other countries and their exports to russia might be indicative of sanctions evasion, when a third country re-exports restricted goods to make them available to the sanctioned state. We recommend accounting for such patterns when assessing jurisdictional risks and considering the implementation of secondary sanctions.

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Published
2026-11-18
How to Cite
Radyk, V. (2026). DETECTING POTENTIAL SANCTIONS BUSTING AND EVASION USING INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS DATA. Kyiv Economic Scientific Journal, (15), 249-258. https://doi.org/10.32782/2786-765X/2026-15-30
Section
SCIENTIFIC ARTICLES